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With millions, perhaps billions, of dollars at stake in the value of a 
brand,1 brand equity can be one of the most important assets in a firm’s 
portfolio.2  Unfortunately, brand equity is an asset that is uniquely 
vulnerable to harm.  Firms can lose the strength, and thus the selling power, 
of those brands through the ordinary course of business.3  Even a firm’s 
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 1.  A ranking by Bloomberg Businessweek of the top one hundred global brands 
reveals estimated values for many top brands in excess of ten billion dollars.  BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, 100 BEST GLOBAL BRANDS 1, available at, http://www.businessweek 
.com/interactive_reports/best_global_brands_2009.html.  The top hundred most valuable 
global brands are worth more than two trillion dollars.  See KEN SCHEPT, BRANDZ TOP 100 
MOST VALUABLE GLOBAL BRANDS (MilwardBrown 2010), available at http://c1547732.cdn. 
cloudfiles.rackspacecloud.com/BrandZ_Top100_2010.pdf. 
 2.  See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Pathways of Legal Strategy, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 
28 (2008) (highlighting Google’s use of brand equity for competitive advantage); Sonia K. 
Katyal, Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The Love that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 58 
BUFF. L. REV. 795, 804 (2010) (noting that the value of a firm’s brand equity can exceed the 
book value ascribed to its product).  See generally Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary 
Approach to Brand Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 945–54 (2006) (describing the value 
of brand equity); Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. Davis, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time 
Has Gone: Brand Equity as Protectable Property, The New/Old Paradigm, 1 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 219, 219–20 (1994) (positing that brand equity is a property right that should be 
entitled to its own protection); Judith Zaichkowsky, Strategies for Distinctive Brands, 17 J. 
BRAND MGMT. 548, 548 (2010) (stating the generally accepted principle that brand equity is 
essential for successful marketing).  For in-depth work on brands from a leading author on 
the issue, see DAVID A. AAKER, BRAND RELEVANCE: MAKING COMPETITORS IRRELEVANT 
(2010); DAVID A. AAKER, BUILDING STRONG BRANDS (1995); DAVID A. AAKER, MANAGING 
BRAND EQUITY: CAPITALIZING ON THE VALUE OF A BRAND NAME (1991). 
 3.  Negative brand effects can occur in a variety of contexts.  See, e.g., Luis J. Diaz & 
Patrick C. Dunican Jr., Ending the Revolving Door Syndrome in Law, 41 SETON HALL L. 
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own misguided behavior through mismanagement or over-popularization of 
the brand can dilute the influence of even the most elite of brand names.4  
Damage to a brand can be so devastating that a firm may wish to 
deliberately and permanently disassociate itself from its meaning to 
consumers.5 
Brand equity is no less vulnerable to the actions of competitors.  For 
example, if one firm uses another’s famous brand in a way that would 
confuse consumers, the value of the brand to its established owner would 
suffer.6  In such circumstances the owner of the brand could sue the 
challenger for trademark infringement in violation of the Lanham Act, 
which prohibits an unauthorized user of a trademark from using it in a way 
that “is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . . .”7 
Litigants protecting their marks have traditionally presented three 
different types of evidence to prove in court a likelihood of confusion by a 
 
REV. 947, 962 (2011) (discussing brand reputation for professional service firms); Steve 
Hartman, Brand Equity Impairment—The Meaning of Dilution, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 418, 
428–33 (1997) (describing brand equity impact in a variety of consumer contexts); Anupam 
Jaju et al., Consumer Evaluations of Corporate Brand Redeployments, 34 J. ACAD. 
MARKETING SCI. 206, 206 (2006) (discussing merger and acquisition activities). 
 4.  Gucci diluted its elite brand by attaching its name to 22,000 widely different 
products, some of which were of low quality and of questionable connection to the Gucci 
image.  See Kevin Lane Keller, Managing the Growth Tradeoff: Challenges and 
Opportunities in Luxury Branding, 16 J. BRAND MGMT. 290, 298 (2008).  See generally 
Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder John, Diluting Brand Beliefs: When Do Brand 
Extensions Have a Negative Impact?, 57 J. MARKETING 71 (1993) (examining situations in 
which brand extensions are likely to dilute beliefs associated with family brand name); 
Pavel Štrach & André M. Everett, Brand Corrosion: Mass-Marketing’s Threat to Luxury 
Automobile Brands After Merger and Acquisition, 15 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 106, 
115–16 (2006) (finding dilution in luxury brands subsequent to overextension of models and 
production quantities). 
 5.  See Aaron Perzanowski, Unbranding, Confusion, and Deception, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 2 (2010) (“When a brand suffers from strong negative consumer perceptions, it 
transforms from a valuable asset to a major liability.  Faced with the reality of an irreparably 
damaged brand, many firms understandably seek a fresh start.”). 
 6.  In trademark disputes, the firm that has established rights to the trademark and 
asserts that a rival is engaging in potentially infringing behavior is known as the senior user 
of the trademark.  The mark itself is frequently called a senior mark.  Correspondingly, the 
company that is being challenged for an allegedly infringing use is known as the junior user, 
and its challenged mark is known as the junior mark.  See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:10 (4th ed. 2012) (“[W]hen a 
junior user uses a mark similar to a senior user’s mark such that there is a likelihood of 
confusion, this is infringement which may be enjoined.  Thus, the scope of exclusivity of a 
trademark is coextensive with the prevention of confusion of customers.”); Thomas R. Lee, 
Demystifying Dilution, 84 B.U. L. REV. 859, 885–86 (2004) (“Dilution occurs . . . whenever 
a junior mark interferes with a trademark’s ability to function as an identifier of a unique 
source of goods.”). 
 7.  15 U.S.C § 1114 (2005). 
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rival.8  Expert witnesses can testify about their beliefs regarding confusion,9 
but such testimony may not represent the consumer’s state of mind and can 
devolve into a “battle of the experts” between hired guns paid to support a 
particular position.10  Litigants also make visual comparisons between 
marks,11 but such comparisons represent only a fraction of what consumers 
might discern in order to determine whether a trademark comes from a 
particular source. 
The third type of evidence, and the one that has intrigued courts and 
scholars for decades, is the consumer survey.12  A consumer survey is an 
instrument used to gather data on the beliefs and attitudes of consumers 
 
 8.  4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at § 23:2.50. 
 9.  4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at § 23:2.75; Michael J. Allen, The Role of Actual Confusion 
Evidence in Federal Trademark Infringement Litigation, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 19, 28 
(1994) (“The best evidence of actual confusion is evidence of individuals who have 
purchased, as a result of similar trademarks, the product of one of the parties under the 
mistaken belief that they are purchasing the other party’s product.”); Keith M. Stolte, 
Remedying Judicial Limitations on Trademark Remedies: Monetary Relief Should Not 
Require Proof of Actual Confusion, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 229, 235–36 (1997) (stating that 
consumer testimony relating to purchases made as a result of confusion is strong evidence of 
actual confusion). 
 10.  Alison M. Andrews, Note, Implied Misrepresentations in Advertisements Under 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Trademark Act: American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson & 
Johnson, 47 ALB. L. REV. 97, 130 (1982) (citing the landmark survey case of Zippo Mfg. 
Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).  Judge Richard Posner 
has also remarked on the problem of expert testimony in the context of trademark litigation: 
Many experts are willing for a generous (and sometimes for a modest) fee to 
bend their science in the direction from which their fee is coming.  The 
constraints that the market in consultant services for lawyers places on this sort 
of behavior are weak, as shown by the fact that both experts in this case were 
hired and, we have no doubt, generously remunerated even though both have 
been criticized in previous judicial opinions.  The judicial constraints on 
tendentious expert testimony are inherently weak because judges (and even 
more so juries, though that is not an issue in a trademark case) lack training or 
experience in the relevant fields of expert knowledge.  But that is the system we 
have.  
Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 415 
(7th Cir. 1994). 
 11.  4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at § 23:2.50. 
 12.  See, e.g., Robert C. Sorensen & Theodore C. Sorensen, Responding to Objections 
Against the Use of Opinion Survey Findings in the Courts, 20 J. MARKETING 133 (1955) 
(arguing in 1955 that current methods of opinion research were sufficiently developed to 
make a definite contribution to judicial process); Note, Public Opinion Surveys as Evidence: 
The Pollsters Go to Court, 66 HARV. L. REV. 498 (1953) (examining evidential and practical 
problems involved in using surveys in litigation). 
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towards products, concepts, or names.13  This data is gathered through a 
variety of means, including consumer queries through shopping malls, 
telephone contacts, and the Internet.14  Litigants use such surveys to 
convince a court that consumer confusion exists (or does not exist) between 
trademarks in lawsuits alleging trademark infringement.15  Consumer 
surveys provide direct evidence about consumer perceptions that expert 
testimony lacks and elicit multifaceted information about perceptions that 
mere visual comparison does not provide. 
It is no wonder, then, that both courts and commentators hold 
consumer surveys in high esteem.  Surveys are considered to have both 
widespread acceptance and vital influence in trademark infringement 
cases.16  Courts have on occasion even faulted litigants for not bringing a 
survey17 and expressed little sympathy even when a small company cannot 
bear the high costs of administering one.18  While courts instruct that 
surveys are not essential, some do not hesitate to remind litigants that 
consumer surveys are the most direct method of showing a likelihood of 
 
 13.  E.g., Robert C. Bird, Streamlining Consumer Survey Analysis: An Examination of 
the Concept of Universe in Consumer Surveys Offered in Intellectual Property Litigation, 88 
TRADEMARK REP. 269, 270 (1998) (“A consumer survey is a scientific method of presenting 
evidence of mental associations of a given group of people by asking a representative 
sample of the relevant target group.  In other words, surveys gather data on the attitudes and 
beliefs of consumers towards a given product, name, or concept.”) (footnote omitted); 
Henry D. Ostberg, Response to the Article Entitled, “A ‘Reading’ Test or a ‘Memory’ Test: 
Which Survey Methodology is Correct?,” 95 TRADEMARK REP. 1446, 1446 (2005) 
(“Consumer surveys used as evidence in trademark litigation frequently involve showing 
respondents one or more products, advertisements or marks and asking the respondents for 
their perceptions and beliefs about these stimuli.”). 
 14.  Bird, supra note 13, at 270. 
 15.  See, e.g., K.J. Greene, Abusive Trademark Litigation and the Incredible Shrinking 
Confusion Doctrine—Trademark Abuse in the Context of Entertainment Media and 
Cyberspace, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620 (2004) (arguing that such reliance makes 
trademark cases fact–driven, and thus judicial determinations of likelihood of confusion are 
necessarily subjective and impressionistic). 
 16.  See, e.g., Gabriel M. Gelb & Betsy D. Gelb, Internet Surveys for Trademark 
Litigation: Ready or Not, Here They Come, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1073, 1075 (2007) (noting 
a general increase of survey use in litigation since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Daubert); Michael Rappeport, Litigation Surveys—Social “Science” as Evidence, 92 
TRADEMARK REP. 957, 957 (2002) (stating that survey evidence is necessary in some 
litigation under the Lanham Act); Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Survey Method on 
Likelihood of Confusion Estimates: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Test, 83 
TRADEMARK REP. 364, 364 (1993) (supporting the routine implementation and resulting 
importance of survey use). 
 17.  See Gimix, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., No. 80 C 6592, 1982 WL 52164, at *1006 
(N.D. Ill. Jan. 13, 1982), aff’d, 699 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1983) (admonishing both sides for 
failing to produce consumer surveys). 
 18.  Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d. 154, 
164 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
BIRD_FINAL_2379679.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2012  5:30 PM 
2012] CONSUMER SURVEYS IN TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 1017 
 
confusion among consumers in trademark infringement cases.19  Consumer 
surveys seem to matter. 
However, in spite of the hundreds of articles and court cases that 
analyze consumer surveys, very little data-driven evidence exists to show 
that consumer surveys are actually widespread, influential, and important.  
The literature suffers from a lack of an empirical understanding about how 
federal courts actually treat consumer surveys, in spite of what scholars and 
judges write about surveys in publications and judicial opinions.  
Addressing this issue is not just yet another attempt to fill a scholarly gap, 
but also has great practical implications for firms faced with defending 
their multi-million or billion-dollar brands in court.  Consumer surveys are 
expensive to create and time consuming to administer.20  Thus, developing 
survey evidence can drain a firm’s limited resources. 
We present an empirical study investigating the role of consumer 
surveys in federal courts by examining more than five hundred court 
opinions over a seven-year period.  Using these data, this article has three 
objectives.  First, we assess how often consumer surveys are actually used 
in federal trademark infringement cases, notwithstanding the anecdotal 
assessment of survey use as pervasive.  Second, we contemplate the rarely 
considered question of whether submission by a plaintiff or defendant 
influences the treatment of the survey by the court.  In theory, it should 
make no difference at all, but the data have the real potential to prove 
otherwise.  Third, we examine whether the strength of the underlying 
evidence in trademark cases impacts the power of the survey.  Consumer 
surveys could be equally helpful or most influential when other evidence is 
absent.  From these three objectives, we conclude that survey evidence is 
 
 19.  E.g., Tone Bros. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Co-
Rect Prods. v. Marvy! Adver. Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1333 n.9 (8th Cir. 1985)) 
(“Consumer surveys are recognized by several circuits as the most direct and persuasive 
evidence of secondary meaning.”); see also Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software 
Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 282 n.10 (3d Cir. 2001) (noting that surveys are not essential 
where other evidence of confusion exists). 
 20.  See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 224 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the 
monetary and time investment in consumer surveys); Dan Sarel & Howard Marmorstein, 
The Effect of Consumer Surveys and Actual Confusion Evidence in Trademark Litigation: 
An Empirical Assessment, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1416, 1416 (2009) (“Obtaining any data 
from consumers, particularly when a properly conducted survey is entailed, is a complex, 
time-consuming, and expensive process.”); see also Lon Tai Shing Co., Ltd. v. Kotch + 
Lowy, No. 90 Civ. 4464(DNE), 1991 WL 170734, at *19 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 1991) 
(claiming that in 1990 surveys could cost as much as $65,000); Robert C. Bird, The Impact 
of the Moseley Decision on Trademark Dilution Law, 26 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 102, 
104 (2007) (stating that surveys can cost between $50,000 and $100,000); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Running the Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1305, 1339 (2011) (noting that consumer surveys are prohibitively expensive for 
smaller businesses). 
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used infrequently, treated subjectively, and has the potential to be either 
dispositive or useless depending on the context of the underlying evidence.  
We complete our article by explaining how firms can use our results to 
calculate mathematically whether developing a consumer survey is 
worthwhile given the firm’s status as plaintiff or defendant and the strength 
of the underlying evidence. 
Part I of this article reviews the Lanham Act, explores the survey 
literature, and highlights the reception given to consumer surveys by 
federal courts.  Part II introduces our dataset and its method of analysis.  
Part III presents the results of our empirical testing and explains our cost-
benefit analysis for choosing whether to create survey evidence.  Part IV 
briefly presents policy implications and limitations of our study.  Part V 
concludes. 
I.  TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT AND CONSUMER SURVEYS 
A.  The Lanham Act 
A trademark is a word or design used on an article of merchandise to 
identify it as the product of a particular manufacturer and to distinguish it 
from others.21  Trademarks are said to facilitate the transmission of accurate 
information and protect the consumer from confusion as to the source of a 
given product.22  Trademarks also establish a product’s distinctiveness from 
its competitors, signal quality or other positive attributes, and serve as 
promotional tools.23  Trademarks prevent consumers from being less able to 
 
 21.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term ‘trademark’ includes any word, name, symbol, 
or device . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . .”); 1 J. 
THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra 
note 6, at § 3:1 (explaining that trademarks “identify the source of one seller’s goods and 
distinguish that source from other sources.”); Vincent-Wayne Mitchell & Íde Kearney, A 
Critique of Legal Measures of Brand Confusion, 11 J. PRODUCT & BRAND MGMT. 357, 359 
(2002). 
 22.  See Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in 
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 556 (2006) (noting that trademark law is designed to 
enable reliable transmission of information); Misha Gregory Macaw, Google, Inc. v. 
American Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc.: A Justification for the Use of Trademarks as 
Keywords to Trigger Paid Advertising Placements in Internet Search Engine Results, 32 
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1, 15 (2005) (“[T]rademarks . . . accurately reflect the 
producer associated with any individual product and consumers will be able to safely rely on 
trademarks as information sources in their purchasing decisions.”). 
 23.  Jacob Jacoby & Maureen Morrin, “Not Manufactured or Authorized by. . .”: 
Recent Federal Cases Involving Trademark Disclaimers, 17 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 
97, 97 (1998); Charles R. Taylor & Michael G. Walsh, Legal Strategies for Protecting 
Brands from Genericide: Recent Trends in Evidence Weighted in Court Cases, 21 J. PUB. 
POL’Y & MARKETING 160, 160 (2002). 
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distinguish desired products from their competitors.24   
Trademarks contribute to economic efficiency by reducing consumer 
search costs.25  A consumer can look to trademarks as shorthand indicators 
of quality, prestige, or product attributes.26  Producers benefit because they 
can invest in building goodwill with the confidence that others will not 
appropriate it.27  Consumers benefit because trademarks relieve the burden 
of having to do exhaustive research about a product’s features.28  While 
marketers do not speak of trademarks per se, they attribute these same 
 
 24.  Others characterize the prevention of consumer confusion as the primary goal of 
trademark infringement protection.  E.g., Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the 
Law of Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923, 
940 (1985) (“The goal of the legislation is not to protect the business enterprise’s trademark 
from encroachment, but to protect consumers from confusion . . . .”); F. T. Alexandra 
Mahaney, Comment, Incontestability: The Park ‘N Fly Decision, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 
1151–52 (1986) (“A trademark generally performs four functions deserving of protection: 
(1) it identifies one seller’s product and distinguishes a product from similar products sold 
by others; (2) it signifies that all goods bearing the same trademark come from a single 
source; (3) it signifies that all goods bearing the same trademark are of equal quality; and (4) 
it is a prime instrument in the advertisement and sale of goods”) (footnote omitted); Kenneth 
L. Port, The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in 
the Making, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 896 (2000) (“[T]he principal legal goal of the 
system is to protect the consumer from confusion.”) (footnote omitted); see also Inwood 
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 854 n.14 (1982) (noting that the two goals of 
the Lanham Act are to protect trademark owners and to protect consumers from confusing 
goods made by competing manufacture). 
 25.  See Bone, supra note 22, at 555 (noting that trademarks reduce consumer search 
costs); see also Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental 
purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer search costs . . . .”); Macaw, supra note 22, at 
15 (claiming that search costs are reduced when there is no source confusion).  
 26.  See Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L. REV. 
2099, 2173 (2004) (claiming that trademarks protect a product’s “goodwill” or prestige 
value); Bone, supra note 22, at 554 (describing the use of trademarks as indicators); Daniel 
J. Gervais, Intellectual Property, Trade & Development: The State of Play, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 505, 521 (2005) (stating that trademarks indicate the source of the good and can 
indicate the desired level of quality); Clarisa Long, Dilution, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 
1034 (2006) (citing the classical view that a trademark is a proxy for certain product 
features). 
 27.  See Gerard N. Magliocca, One and Inseparable: Dilution and Infringement in 
Trademark Law, 85 MINN. L. REV. 949, 958 (2001) (asserting that trademarks “encourage 
producers to invest” knowing that their investment cannot be “poach[ed]” by competitors); 
cf. Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 752 (2004) (arguing 
that unprotected marks would diminish the goodwill associated with the mark). 
 28.  See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163–64 (1995) (reasoning 
that trademark law “reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing 
decisions . . . .” (quoting 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2.01(2), at 2–3 (3d ed. 1994))); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. 
Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 
778 (2004) (stating that trademark law can improve the flow of information in markets). 
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functions to brands.29  Indeed, trademarks are essentially what marketers 
refer to as branding elements, the most salient being the brand name.30 
The statute most responsible for protecting trademarks against 
confusion is the Lanham Act of 1946.31  The Act prohibits the unauthorized 
use of a registered mark in a fashion that is “likely to cause confusion, or to 
cause mistake, or to deceive.”32  The goals of the Lanham Act are to 
provide a cause of action against those who use deceptive or misleading 
marks,33 protect mark holders against unfair competition,34 protect the 
ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers, and avoid 
confusion about the potential source of a product.35  Trademark owners 
 
 29.  See Joel H. Steckel et al., Dilution Through the Looking Glass: A Marketing Look 
at the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 616, 621 (2006) (“[I]t 
goes without saying that much of what marketers have written about brands applies to 
trademarks.”).  This does not mean that legal trademark policy and marketing practice 
always coordinate harmoniously.  One tension is that marketers often want to make their 
brands easier to interpret and thus more descriptive.  This goal, however, impedes the 
lawyer’s goal of protecting the trademark rights that identify those same brands.  
Trademarks that are more descriptive in nature have a greater burden to show secondary 
meaning than their less descriptive (and more fanciful) counterparts.  See id. at 622 n.26. 
 30.  E.g. Keller, supra note 4, at 292 (noting the importance of trademarks in protecting 
brand image). 
 31. Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1141n (2006)); Matthew D. Bunker, You Can’t Handle the Truth (In Music): Does the 
Lanham Act Preempt State “Truth in Music” Laws?, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2011) 
(describing the Lanham Act as the “primary source of federal trademark protection.”); 
Edward T. Saadi, Sound Recordings Need Sound Protection, 5 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 
352 n.90 (1997) (“The Lanham Act is the primary federal trademark and unfair competition 
statute.”); Anne M. Mellen, Comment, Awarding Attorneys’ Fees Under the Lanham Act: 
Egregious Litigation Conduct in the “Exceptional” Case, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1111, 1113 
(2006) (describing the primacy of the Lanham Act); see also Marlene B. Hanson & W. 
Casey Walls, Protecting Trademark Good Will: The Case for a Federal Standard of 
Misappropriation, 81 TRADEMARK REP. 480, 501 (1990) (discussing how state antidilution 
laws supplement the Lanham Act). 
 32.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2006). 
 33.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The intent of this Act is to . . . mak[e] actionable the 
deceptive and misleading use of marks in such commerce; to protect registered marks used 
in such commerce from interference by State, or territorial legislation; to protect persons 
engaged in such commerce against unfair competition . . . .”); see also Jennifer E. Rothman, 
Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 105, 123 (2005) (noting that one purpose of Lanham Act is to regulate deceptive and 
misleading uses). 
 34.  15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 35.  Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (stating that 
the Lanham Act helps consumers distinguish among competing products); Peter W. Smith, 
Note, Trademarks, Parody, and Consumer Confusion: A Workable Lanham Act 
Infringement Standard, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1525, 1529 (1991) (“One of the principal goals 
of the Lanham Act is to protect consumers from confusion and deception in the 
marketplace.”). 
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who can successfully prove their case in court can obtain an injunction 
against the infringer to prevent the use from continuing.36 
Typically, the senior user of the mark is the plaintiff and alleges that 
the junior user’s (i.e., the defendant’s) use of the same or a similar mark 
creates a likelihood of confusion.37  A small number of declaratory 
judgment cases reverse the typical role of plaintiff and defendant in that the 
plaintiff in those cases is the junior user asking the court to declare that a 
mark does not infringe.38  In these declaratory judgment cases, the 
defendant (i.e., the senior user) often responds with a trademark 
infringement counterclaim and endeavors to show that a likelihood of 
confusion of its trademark has indeed occurred by the junior user.39 
A single statutory framework governs how a likelihood-of-confusion 
of relevant consumers is proven and remedied in federal court.40  Yet, 
considerable variance exists as to how this framework is interpreted and 
applied.  In 1961, the landmark case of Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad 
Electronics Corp. established a list of factors that a court should consider 
when determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists.41  The Second 
Circuit listed eight factors relevant for determining consumer confusion:  
(1) the strength of the plaintiff’s mark; (2) the degree of similarity between 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s marks; (3) the proximity of the products; (4) the 
likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap; (5) actual confusion; (6) the 
 
 36.  15 U.S.C. § 1114(2) (2006). 
 37.  See Kathleen B. McCabe, Note, Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the 
Shadow of Trademark Infringement, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1827, 1828 (2000) (asserting that 
the traditional trademark infringement claim occurs when a senior user asserts her trademark 
is misappropriated by the junior user in order to confuse consumers about the source of the 
good); 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at §§ 24:1 (describing the typical process for trademark 
infringement claims); Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual 
Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1204 n.13 (2008) (“The typical trademark 
infringement case involves a claim of direct confusion in which a defendant (the ‘junior’ or 
second user) exploits the goodwill of an established ‘senior’ user by selling products with a 
trademark so similar to the established company’s trademark that consumers mistakenly 
believe the junior user’s products come from the senior user.”). 
 38.  See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at §§ 32:50, :57 (describing the reversal of roles that occurs in a 
small number of cases). 
 39.  When we built our dataset (to be discussed shortly), we consistently treated the 
senior user as the plaintiff and the junior user as the defendant, even in declaratory judgment 
cases, to account for the typical incentives of the parties. 
 40.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (2006); 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON 
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 27:13; Sheldon W. Halpern, A 
High Likelihood of Confusion: Wal-Mart, Traffix, Moseley, and Dastar—The Supreme 
Court’s New Trademark Jurisprudence, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 237, 248 (2005) 
(discussing the Lanham Act and the “peculiar federal scheme” for remedies). 
 41.  287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820 (1961). 
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defendant’s good faith in adopting the mark; (7) the quality of defendant’s 
product; and (8) the sophistication of the buyers.42 
The thirteen federal circuits, being largely independent operating 
jurisdictions, developed their own equivalents of Polaroid factors for 
proving likelihood of confusion.43  Although some tests are similar to one 
another, considerable variance exists among circuits.44  While some circuits 
list at least ten factors, other circuits only articulate six or seven.45  While 
all circuits consider the strength of the plaintiff’s mark, the similarity of the 
two marks, and the defendant’s intent, only six circuits consider the 
similarity of sales facilities and only ten circuits consider the sophistication 
of the consumer in determining the likelihood of confusion.46  Furthermore, 
four circuits do not consider the similarity of advertising and marketing 
methods between the litigants.47  The result is that considerable variance 
exists among circuits about the proof necessary to show likelihood of 
confusion.48  Table 1 lists the various Polaroid factors used by the different 
 
 42.  Id.  The court also acknowledged that this list was not exhaustive and that other 
variables may need to be considered.  Id. 
 43.  Likelihood-of-confusion tests vary significantly among circuits.  See Boston Duck 
Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Pignons S.A. de 
Mecanique de Precision v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981)) (eight 
factors); Frisch’s Rests., Inc. v. Elby’s Big Boy of Steubenville, Inc., 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th 
Cir. 1982) (citing AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979)) 
(eight factors); AMF, 599 F.2d at 348–49 (eight factors); Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495 (eight 
factors); Malarkey-Taylor Assocs. v. Cellular Telecomms. Indus. Ass’n, 929 F. Supp. 473, 
477 (D.D.C. 1996) (citing Polaroid, 287 F.2d at 495) (eight factors), with Interpace Corp. v. 
Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d Cir. 1983) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold, 
Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978)) (ten factors); In re E.I. DuPont de Nemours & 
Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (thirteen factors), Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I 
Ltd., 155 F.3d 526, 541 (5th Cir. 1998) (seven factors); Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 
F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (citing Sun-Fun Prods., Inc. v. Suntan Research & Dev., 
Inc., 656 F.2d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 1981)) (seven factors); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church 
& Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. Veb Carl 
Zeiss Jena, Steelmasters, Inc., 433 F.2d 686, 705 (2d Cir. 1970)) (seven factors); SquirtCo v. 
Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980) (six factors); Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. 
Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 833 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing King of the Mountain Sports, 
Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089 (10th Cir. 1999)) (six factors, with one factor 
combining two commonly separate criteria); Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 
1514 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d 833, 
840 (11th Cir. 1983)) (seven factors). 
 44.  See 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 24:30 (“[E]ach of the 13 federal circuit courts of appeal has 
developed its own version of the list and each appears to be jealous of its own formulation 
of factors.”). 
 45.  See infra Table 1. 
 46.  See infra Table 1. 
 47.  See infra Table 1. 
 48.  See infra Table 1. 
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federal circuits. 
B.  Research in Consumer Surveys by Legal and Marketing Scholars 
Scholars explore consumer surveys from a variety of perspectives.  In 
addition to the case-based analysis commonly seen in law reviews,49 there 
is also a focus on consumer surveys in the marketing literature.  Legal 
developments impact marketing strategies and, in turn, innovations in 
marketing research influence how courts apply legal protections.50  
Trademarks are also understood as strategic marketing tools.51  The result is 
 
 49.  E.g., Sandra Edelman, Failure to Conduct a Survey in Trademark Infringement 
Cases: A Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 768–69 (2000) 
(analyzing how courts respond to a plaintiff’s failure to present survey evidence); Natalie-
Claire Woods, Survey, Survey Evidence in Lanham Act Violations, 15 TRINITY L. REV. 67, 
77–79 (2008) (comparing survey methods). 
 50.  See Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. 
REV. 827, 836 (2004) (“[M]arketing professionals still seek to produce the kind of 
unthinking responses to brands that much trademark law assumes occurs . . . .”); Ross D. 
Petty, The Codevelopment of Trademark Law and the Concept of Brand Marketing in the 
United States Before 1946, 31 J. MACROMARKETING 85, 90 (2011) (noting that judicial 
enforcement encouraged manufacturers to invest in brand marketing); Swann, supra note 2, 
at 945 (claiming that “explosive developments” in marketing since the 1960s translated into 
“more predictable, accurate and consumer-beneficial” results in trademark disputes); David 
S. Welkowitz, Famous Marks Under the TDRA, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 983, 994 (2009) 
(arguing that the expansion of infringement protection to include non-competing products 
solidified the role of trademarks as a marketing tool); Erin Lenhardt, Note, Why So Glum?  
Toward a Fair Balance of Competitive Interests in Direct-to-Consumer Advertising and the 
Well-Being of the Mentally Ill Consumers it Targets, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 165, 181 (2005) 
(stating that from a marketing perspective, trademark law protects brand equity, which is 
built through widespread exposure of the mark or brand name). 
 51.  See Dorothy Cohen, Trademark Strategy, 50 J. MARKETING 61, 61 (1986) (arguing 
that marketers will have to become more familiar with trademark law as they become more 
active in setting trademark strategy); Dorothy Cohen, Trademark Strategy Revisited, 55 J. 
MARKETING 46, 46 (1991) (arguing that legal developments require marketers to become 
familiar with trademark law); Dennis S. Corgill, Measuring the Gains of Trademark 
Infringement, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1909, 1939 (1997) (arguing that a trademark can be a 
valuable marketing tool when it conveys information about the product “more efficiently” 
than other marketing devices); Alan S. Gutterman, A Legal Due Diligence Framework for 
Inbound Transfers of Foreign Technology Rights, 24 INT’L LAW. 976, 987 (1990) (claiming 
that trademarks can be valuable marketing tools because they can imply a certain level of 
quality); Angela L. Patterson, Comment, With Liberty and Domain Names for All: 
Restructuring Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policies, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 375, 415 
(2003) (arguing that trademarks are marketing tools because they can facilitate a customer’s 
ability to find and purchase items on a firm’s website); Ross D. Petty, Naming Names: 
Trademark Strategy and Beyond: Part One—Selecting a Brand Name, 15 J. BRAND MGMT. 
190, 190 (2008) (examining the interplay between trademark law and marketing strategy in 
selecting a brand name and presenting strategies to limit the ability of rivals to select and 
use other brand names); John D. Shakow, Note, Just Steal It: Political Sloganeering and the 
Rights of Trademark Holders, 14 J.L. & POL. 199, 204 (1998) (stating that well known 
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a fairly rich body of information about consumer surveys from a welcome 
non-legal perspective. 
For example, Stewart evaluated the characteristics of surveys that 
were introduced into evidence during an advertising misrepresentation case 
brought by the Federal Trade Commission against Kraft in the early 
1990s.52  An article by Ford explored the impact of an important United 
States Supreme Court decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.,53 on the underlying rules of whether a survey is admissible as evidence 
at a trial.54  A paper by Hastak, Mazis, and Morris examined the use of 
surveys in the development and process of policymaking.55 
Studies have also examined the role of consumer surveys in a variety 
of trademark contexts that are distinct from infringement cases.  For 
example, Morrin, Lee, and Allenby measured the extent of harm from 
trademark dilution by using a Bayesian version of the associative network 
model.56  The study found that even a single exposure to diluting brand 
stimuli reduced brand recall by about one-third on average.57  The authors 
also used their findings to advise litigants on how to evaluate confusion 
factors in trademark dilution lawsuits.58  Another article examined the 
reception of consumer surveys by courts in trademark dilution cases and 
found that courts remain skeptical of survey evidence in a variety of 
contexts.59  In addition to dilution, scholars have reviewed court cases to 
evaluate what evidence courts consider in making findings of genericide, 
the cancellation of a trademark when consumers use the mark to describe a 
 
trademarks are valuable marketing tools because they “enhance a company’s goodwill by 
creating positive associations with customers”). 
 52.  David Stewart, Deception, Materiality, and Survey Research: Some Lessons from 
Kraft, 14 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 15, 21–23 (1995). 
 53.  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 54.  Gary T. Ford, The Impact of the Daubert Decision on Survey Research Used in 
Litigation, 24 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 234, 234 (2005). 
 55.  Manoj Hastak et al., The Role of Consumer Surveys in Public Policy Decision 
Making, 20 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 170, 170 (2001). 
 56.  Maureen Morrin et al., Determinants of Trademark Dilution, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 
248, 249 (2006).  The associative network memory model in psychology views memory as a 
network of nodes, each representing a piece of stored information and connected by links 
which reflect the strength of the association between two pieces of information.  This theory 
casts the brand and the trademark as two nodes in memory.  JOHN R. ANDERSON, THE 
ARCHITECTURE OF COGNITION (1983); Thomas K. Srull & Robert S. Wyer, Jr., Person 
Memory and Judgment, 96 PSYCH. REV. 59 (1989). 
 57.  Morrin et al., supra note 56, at 253. 
 58.  Id. at 254. 
 59.  Bird, supra note 20, at 102; see also John P. Liefeld, How Surveys Overestimate 
the Likelihood of Consumer Confusion, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 939, 941 (2003) (arguing that 
surveys can overestimate likelihood of confusion by creating a response bias toward well-
known companies). 
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generic category of products rather than a specific brand.60 
Development of guidelines and standards for survey evidence is also 
an important focus in the legal literature.61  Early research focused on 
increasing the likelihood that surveys would even be admissible as 
evidence in court.62  Later, Morgan proposed guidelines for developing 
survey research for use in court that would reflect explicit and implicit 
judicial perspectives of survey research methodology.63  Morgan based his 
recommendations on a review of federal cases time incorporated survey 
research.64  Legal treatises present elaborate guidelines for devising and 
assessing a survey’s effectiveness.65  Guidelines exist on survey design, 
population definition and sampling, data entry methods, interview 
techniques, and survey question structure in order to elicit accurate and 
unbiased results.66  In general, these guidelines conform to standards in 
marketing theory and practice.67 
C.  Judicial Reception to Survey Research 
In judicial opinions, courts have directly discussed the importance of 
survey research in likelihood of confusion cases.  Courts have called 
consumer surveys some of the most direct and persuasive evidence 
available to establish trademark infringement.68  The absence of a consumer 
 
 60.  Taylor & Walsh, supra note 23, at 160. 
 61.  E.g., Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in Trademark 
Litigation, 19 MEMPHIS ST. U. L. REV. 471, 478–80 (1989) (discussing standards of when to 
conduct surveys and forms of survey questions); John Paul Reiner, The Universe and 
Sample: How Good is Good Enough?, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 366, 366–75 (1983) (discussing 
guidelines for the surveys). 
 62.  Fred W. Morgan, The Admissibility of Consumer Surveys as Legal Evidence in 
Courts, 43 J. MARKETING 33, 38–39 (1979) (arguing that the increased use of surveys in 
court will enhance judges’ sophistication in evaluating survey methodology); Sorensen & 
Sorensen, supra note 12, at 133 (arguing in 1955 that survey methods were sufficiently 
rigorous and reliable to be used in court). 
 63.  Fred W. Morgan, Judicial Standards for Survey Research: An Update and 
Guidelines, 54 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 59, 68–69 (1990). 
 64.  Id. at 59. 
 65.  See, e.g., Benoît Gauthier, CIRCUM NETWORK INC., Assessing Survey Research: A 
Principled Approach (Mar. 2, 2003), 
http://www.circum.qc.ca/textes/assessing_survey_research.pdf (proposing guidelines for 
assessing a survey’s effectiveness). 
 66.  Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 236–69 (Joe Cecil & Dean Miletich eds., 2000). 
 67.  See generally, DAVID A. AAKER ET AL., MARKETING RESEARCH (10th ed. 2009) 
(discussing marketing research theories and methodologies). 
 68.  E.g., Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 283 
n.10 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Charles Jacquin Et Cie, Inc. v. Destileria Serralles, Inc., 921 F.2d 
467, 476 (3d Cir. 1990)); Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 
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survey has strongly suggested to some courts that the contents of the survey 
would have been unfavorable if administered.69  One judge contrasted the 
“enormous sums” the plaintiff invested in market research for its product 
launch with its failure to commission a consumer survey in litigation, and 
thus drew an adverse inference from the absence of a survey.70  A 
defendant, who has no burden of proof in trademark infringement cases, 
was even faulted for failing to produce a survey in court.71  Courts have 
expressed little sympathy even for small companies lacking the financial 
resources to shoulder the extraordinary costs of survey design and 
implementation.72 
Some commentators have similarly elevated consumer surveys to high 
evidentiary importance.  A consumer survey is believed to attract so much 
attention that it can distract the court from other important evidence.73  One 
commentator canvassing court cases remarked that when a plaintiff chooses 
not to present a consumer survey, the owner of the trademark may be 
perceived as “less than deadly serious about its case.”74  Another stated that 
“[s]electing and performing a consumer survey for use as evidence in a 
trademark dispute represents one of the most important decisions made by 
 
1989) (“An expert survey of purchasers can provide the most persuasive evidence of 
secondary meaning.”) (citing Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 778 F.2d 1352, 1358 
(9th Cir., 1985))); McNeil Nutritionals, L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweeteners L.L.C., 566 F. 
Supp. 2d 378, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (“[C]onsumer surveys are useful, and indeed the most 
direct method of demonstrating secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion . . . .”) 
(quoting Charles Jacquin Et Cie, 921 F.2d at 476)). 
 69.  See Charles Jacquin Et Cie, 921 F.2d at 475–76 (noting that while consumer 
surveys are not necessary to establish likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act, a 
plaintiff’s failure to conduct a survey when it has the means to do so could lead a jury to 
believe that the results of the survey would be unfavorable to the plaintiff); E.S. Originals 
Inc. v. Stride Rite Corp., 656 F. Supp. 484, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding it significant that 
the defendant failed to conduct a consumer survey when it had the means to do so, 
indicating that the defendant did not believe that it could demonstrate likelihood of 
confusion).  But see Edelman, supra note 49, at 768–69 (concluding that some courts draw 
an adverse inference from a party’s failure to present survey data, while others treat a lack of 
survey data neutrally). 
 70.  Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 335, 373 (D.N.J. 2002). 
 71.  Gimix, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., No. 80 C 6592, 1982 WL 52164, at *1006  (N.D. 
Ill. Jan. 13, 1982). 
 72.  Sports Traveler, Inc. v. Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc., 25 F. Supp. 2d. 154, 
164 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (explaining that a plaintiff’s burden to produce probative evidence of 
confusion, such as by means of a consumer survey, is not conditioned on plaintiff’s financial 
resources). 
 73.  See James Swire, Remarks at Panel Discussion, Legal Standards for Consumer 
Survey Research, 23 J. ADVERTISING RES. 19 19, 23 (1983) (describing how a defective 
survey harmed a litigant’s otherwise strong case). 
 74.  6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 32:195.  
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trial counsel . . . .”75  Still another called surveys “all but indispensable” in 
successfully demonstrating that a trademark is worthy of protection.76 
At the same time, judges have not been reluctant to discount consumer 
surveys if they conclude that the survey methodology was flawed.  
Consumer surveys in court undergo an aggressive examination for 
methodological flaws by experts hired by the opposing party.77  As a result, 
criticisms related to virtually every aspect of a survey’s design—including 
selection of sample, interviewer bias, suggestive wording, and 
inappropriate purchasing conditions—often give judges reason to discount 
surveys before them.78  The judge has to sift through the evidence to 
determine whether the criticisms are valid.  This process places consumer 
surveys in the difficult position of being both supposedly essential evidence 
and highly vulnerable to criticism.  This complicated role of surveys makes 
the need to test them empirically and understand their impact in trademark 
cases all the more compelling. 
D.  Data-Driven Research on Consumer Survey Use in Federal Court 
Studies that look beyond individual cases to examine a substantial 
dataset of trademark case law are most relevant to our research.  While 
case-based analysis has existed for decades, data-driven research is a more 
recent vintage.  For example, Jacoby and Morrin reviewed several federal 
trademark infringement cases from 1994 through 1997 that were published 
in a commercial legal database.79  The authors concluded, among other 
findings, that courts often heavily discount survey evidence and that a lack 
of convergence exists on how to measure the likelihood of confusion in 
trademark infringement cases.80 
More recent work systematically analyzes larger datasets.  For 
example, one study examined the relationship between plaintiffs’ 
presentation of survey and actual confusion evidence and injunction 
outcomes in 126 federal trademark infringement cases between 2001 and 
 
 75.  Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Surveys: Development of Computer-Based 
Survey Methods, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 91 (2004). 
 76.  Joshua M. Dalton & Ilisa Horowitz, Funny When You Think About It: Double 
Entendres and Trademark Protectibility, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 649, 652 
(2006). 
 77.  See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 32:178 (“It is notoriously easy for one survey expert to appear 
to tear apart the methodology of a survey taken by another.”). 
 78.  Id. at § 32:171 (observing that courts discredit the evidential weight of deficient 
surveys). 
 79.  Jacoby & Morrin, supra note 23, at 17. 
 80.  Id. at 103–04. 
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2006.81  The authors found that plaintiffs received a modest improvement in 
outcomes through the presentation of actual confusion or survey evidence.82  
The authors reported that their results are not statistically significant.  This 
means that the authors could not sufficiently discount the reasonable 
possibility that the results could have occurred by chance.83  Nonetheless, 
the authors noted that the results were still directionally interesting and 
showed that the odds of winning improved only slightly with presentation 
of actual confusion or survey evidence.84 
Of greatest relevance to our research is a thoughtful study by Barton 
Beebe.85  While our focus here is the treatment of consumer surveys in 
federal courts, Beebe’s work studied the varying application across circuits 
of multifactor tests for likelihood of confusion.  Beebe examined 331 trial-
level opinions that articulated the multifactor test of consumer confusion in 
trademark cases between 2000 and 2004.86  He used regression trees to 
investigate what factors were most influential in determining likelihood of 
confusion in trademark infringement cases.87 
His results were consistent with the proposition that courts do not 
consider all factors in their circuit’s multifactor test for likelihood of 
confusion.88  Instead, Beebe found that courts simply examined a few 
 
 81.  Sarel & Marmorstein, supra note 20, at 1417, 1423. 
 82.  Id. at 1430. 
 83.  By contrast, findings of statistical significance can make such a conclusion about 
empirical results.  See, e.g., Lisa Faigman, The “M Word” Symposium: An Interdisciplinary 
Adventure, 23 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 3, 25 n.96 (2012) (“In scientific studies, if an 
observed difference does not rise to the level of ‘statistical significance,’ it essentially means 
that the observed findings could have occurred by chance.”); Bradley W. Joondeph, The 
Partisan Dimensions of Federal Preemption in the United States Courts of Appeals, 2011 
UTAH L. REV. 223, 237 (2011) (“[A] finding of statistical significance means that if the null 
hypothesis is true, there is less than a 5% chance that we would see the observed 
difference.”).  Expressed more technically, a non-statistically significant finding means that 
a statistical comparison (such as a t, F, or chi value statistic) did not reach the critical level 
of having a probability of appearing of .05 or less if all differences were purely random.  
This critical level is often denoted p < .05.  Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional 
Behavior Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE 
U. L. REV. 175, 201 n.160 (2011).  As Zirkel explains: 
 Chi-square is a statistical procedure to determine whether the frequency counts in 
two or more categories in a sample . . . are differently distributed to a significant 
extent, i.e., that the frequency counts are not due to chance but are instead 
generally applicable with a high degree of probability to a population . . . . 
Id. at 200 n.157. 
 84.  Sarel & Marmorstein, supra note 20, at 1430. 
 85.  Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark 
Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581 (2006). 
 86.  Id. at 1593. 
 87.  Id. at 1600. 
 88.  Id. at 1599. 
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factors through “fast and frugal” heuristics.89  In particular, Beebe 
discovered that a court’s finding regarding the “[s]imilarity of the marks,” 
“[p]roximity of the goods,” and “[s]trength of plaintiff’s mark,” favored 
confusion in a dominant share of plaintiff verdicts.90  A subsequent study 
expanded on Beebe’s inquiry to look at 224 cases from the Southern 
District of New York that were published during a fifteen-year period.91  
While Beebe’s primary focus was on the variation of application of the 
multifactor test across the federal circuits, Beebe’s analysis only briefly 
addressed survey data.92 
For our work on consumer surveys, the relevant question is what 
impact surveys have on the outcome of court cases.  Our research builds on 
the aforementioned work on multifactor tests of trademark infringement 
and consumer surveys and offers a novel contribution to the literature on 
likelihood of confusion cases.  The study methods and presentation of the 
data follow. 
II.  STUDY METHODS AND PRESENTATION OF DATA 
A.  Data Collection 
The data for this study were collected from published opinions in 
trademark infringement cases involving confusion written by federal trial 
court judges in the United States between 2000 and 2006.93  For the years 
2000 through 2004, we obtained Beebe’s dataset.  This is the same dataset 
that Beebe used in his examination of the multifactor tests of trademark 
infringement. 
In addition to Beebe’s dataset, we hand-coded two additional years of 
data (2005 and 2006), following the same coding methods Beebe used for 
the prior years.  We obtained data by gathering opinions using Westlaw and 
LexisNexis, two commercial legal research databases, and used search 
terms to capture any opinion which discussed a multifactor test for proving 
 
 89.  Id. at 1602. 
 90.  Id. at 1611, Table 4. 
 91.  Kevin Blum et al., Consistency of Confusion? A Fifteen-Year Revisiting of Barton 
Beebe’s Empirical Analysis of Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 2010 STAN. 
TECH. L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2010). 
 92.  Beebe, supra note 85, at 1622, 1641–42. 
 93.  This paper focuses primarily on trademark infringement claims that sought to show 
consumer confusion between the senior (established) mark and the junior adoption of its 
mark.  We do not explicitly explore disputes involving misappropriation, licensing, dilution, 
or false advertising, although we certainly hold open the possibility that our findings here 
have some relevance to these classes of cases. 
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trademark infringement in any meaningful way.94 
Similar to Beebe, we reviewed the judicial opinions from these results 
and eliminated any case that did not make substantial use of a multifactor 
test of the factors in Table 1.  We also removed from the dataset any cases 
that involved counterfeiting, franchising, licensing, or a distribution 
agreement that might skew the results.95  Like Beebe, we did not 
incorporate appellate decisions into our dataset to avoid redundancy.96  We 
also did not consider claims of trademark dilution. 
Our data collection and coding returned 202 additional cases.  Adding 
these cases to Beebe’s dataset of 311 created a total of 533 federal 
trademark cases for our entire dataset.  The vast majority of these additions 
were cases published in 2005 and 2006.  A small number of the cases 
added (fifteen) were opinions written between 2000 and 2004 that fit 
Beebe’s criteria but were not included in Beebe’s dataset, apparently 
because of delayed reporting by LexisNexis and Westlaw. 
From this dataset, we examined how courts treated all likelihood of 
confusion factors relevant in their circuit.  As noted earlier, each federal 
circuit has its own likelihood of confusion standard.97  Coding whether a 
court concluded that a given factor favored or disfavored confusion was 
relatively straightforward.  Courts typically state explicitly whether a given 
factor favored confusion, disfavored confusion, or had no effect.  When a 
court did not discuss a factor, deemed it not relevant, or otherwise left it not 
clearly resolved, we coded accordingly. 
Our dataset also notes whether or not the plaintiff or defendant 
submitted a survey.  Our dataset reports whether a submitted survey was 
credited by the court.  We considered a survey to be credited if the judge 
indicated that, despite any flaws, the survey contained at least some 
probative value in favor of the party submitting the survey.  For example, if 
the plaintiff submitted a survey and the court found that the survey helped 
show a likelihood of confusion, despite problems with the survey’s 
methodology, we considered that survey to be credited by the court. 
Two caveats from our data collection process bear mentioning.  First, 
 
 94.  For the district courts of each circuit, Beebe ran the following search in Westlaw:  
(“trademark infringement” & confus!) or (“trademark mark” & “likelihood of confusion”) & 
da(aft 12/31/1999 & bef 01/01/2005).  For LexisNexis, Beebe ran the following search:   
(“trademark infringement” & confus!) or ((trademark mark) & “likelihood of confusion”) 
and date(geq (01/01/2000) and leq (12/31/2005)).  We followed these search criteria for the 
additional two years coded. 
 95.  In these cases, the likelihood of confusion is often quite clear and the factors 
overwhelmingly favor the plaintiff. 
 96.  Beebe, supra note 85, at 1593 (collecting only district court case data); Sarel & 
Marmorstein, supra note 20, at 1422–23 (describing the dataset). 
 97.  See infra Table 1. 
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the data only include cases that actually went to court.  To the extent that 
cases that settle differ from those that reach court, our findings do not 
generalize to the universe of infringement lawsuits.  These caveats apply to 
similar studies on surveys as well.98  Indeed, there may be a difference 
between those cases that reach court and those that do not.  In those cases 
that reach court, both sides believe that they have a chance to succeed.  
Thus, our dataset will tend to include litigants who have the resources to 
litigate as well as the confidence that their side will win in court. 
Second, although we believe that using LexisNexis and Westlaw to 
gather cases represents a substantially comprehensive review of the cases 
during the study period, the electronic databases do not report every 
judicial opinion in the United States.  LexisNexis and Westlaw, although 
generally quite thorough, have their own methods of selecting opinions for 
inclusion in their database and exclude according to certain criteria.99  In 
spite of this limitation, we have no reason to believe that the cases reported 
by Lexis and Westlaw are inaccurate reflections of federal trademark 
infringement court decisions nationwide. 
B.  Plan of Analysis and Justification 
We performed our analysis in multiple stages.  Our first task was to 
answer the basic question of how often litigants submitted consumer 
surveys as evidence in trademark infringement cases.  In order to answer 
this question, we simply counted the number in which surveys were 
submitted relative to the number of total cases in our dataset. 
Even this simple count data can reveal meaningful information about 
survey usage and court conduct.  Most obviously, it reveals how often 
survey data is used in trademark infringement cases.  This frequency can 
imply some information about influence of surveys over disputes.  If the 
frequency of survey data is high, this supports the belief that survey 
evidence is indeed a common and even necessary proof to show likelihood 
of confusion.100 
The frequency of survey use also adds to the discussion on the 
 
 98.  See Beebe, supra note 85, at 1597 (describing limitations of the data); Blum et al., 
supra note 91, at 4 (describing methodology for data analysis); Sarel & Marmorstein, supra 
note 20, at 1422–23 (explaining survey methodology). 
 99.  See, e.g., Kimberly D. Krawiec & Kathryn Zeiler, Common-Law Disclosure Duties 
and the Sin of Omission: Testing the Meta-Theories, 91 VA. L. REV. 1795, 1832 & n.100 
(2005) (noting the selection biases inherent when using Westlaw and LexisNexis). 
 100.  E.g., Edelman, supra note 49, at 747 (“[S]urvey evidence has become de rigeur in 
trademark infringement cases.”); Simonson, supra note 16, at 364 (“[S]urveys are now 
routinely employed to prove likelihood of confusion, and a failure to introduce a survey into 
evidence often leads to harsh criticism by the courts.”). 
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influence of science on judicial decision making.  An important discussion 
in the literature involves the susceptibility of judges to “junk science,” in 
part because of their lack of empirical and mathematical training.101  
Combining this information with the frequency of favorable results for the 
survey user, we can speculate whether the mere presence of scientific 
evidence such as a consumer survey, regardless of survey quality, might 
generate a halo effect on the quality and persuasiveness of other evidence. 
In addition to counting survey use, we classified our surveys 
according to which litigant submitted the evidence to the court.  This 
variable segments the data according to whether a plaintiff or defendant 
submitted the evidence.  In rare cases, both plaintiff and defendant 
submitted a survey in the same case, and we code such instances 
accordingly. 
We separate plaintiff from defendant because the parties have 
different motivations in the production of evidence in a trademark dispute 
involving consumer confusion.  Their differing motivations might influence 
the quality and emphasis of surveys that they construct.  For example, the 
plaintiff holds the burden of persuasion and therefore would be more 
motivated to produce survey evidence to show consumer confusion.102  The 
defendant, by contrast, must merely show that the plaintiff’s evidence was 
insufficient.103  Thus, the defendant may be less motivated to submit a 
survey that matches the complexity and expense of the plaintiff’s, if it 
chooses to commission one at all.  Therefore, the quantity and impact of 
survey production might differ between plaintiff and defendant. 
The second stage of our analysis, a series of logistic regressions, 
produces insight into the effectiveness of surveys.  We avoid simply 
counting and cross-classifying survey usage with other variables.  Such an 
analysis might be subject to errors in interpretation because it does not 
control for other evidence in the case.104  Our logistic regressions of the 
 
 101.  See, e.g., Michael I. Meyerson & William Meyerson, Significant Statistics: The 
Unwitting Policy Making of Mathematically Ignorant Judges, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 771, 776 
(2010) (“[W]hile striving to avoid accepting ‘junk science’ into evidence, too many judges 
have permitted statisticians and others to allow ‘junk law’ into the courts.”); Paul S. Miller 
et al., Daubert and the Need for Judicial Scientific Literacy, 77 JUDICATURE 254 (1994) 
(arguing for systematic judicial education on science and the scientific method). 
 102.  See Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and 
Procedural Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
1027, 1062 (2007) (describing the opposite evidentiary burdens of plaintiff and defendant); 
see also Ruth M. Corbin & Arthur Renaud, What’s Good for the Goose Is Bad for the 
Gander: Why Confusion Surveys for Plaintiff and Defendant Should Be Different, 16 
INTELL. PROP. J. 177 (2003) (arguing that confusion surveys for defendants and plaintiffs 
should not be similar). 
 103.  Manta, supra note 102, at 1062 (noting lower burden of persuasion for defendants). 
 104.  See Matthew Sag et al., Ideology and Exceptionalism in Intellectual Property: An 
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form Pr(Confusion Found) = f(Predictive Variables) enable such control 
variables to be accounted for. 
For additional variables, we first inquire into how a court treats survey 
evidence.  Not all surveys are treated equally by judges.  Some courts reject 
survey evidence out of hand as being insufficiently persuasive or lacking 
scientific rigor; other courts are more receptive.  We account for this 
differential treatment by evaluating whether a survey was credited by a 
court.  As noted earlier, we consider a survey to be credited if the judge 
indicated that, despite any flaws inherent in the survey, it still contained at 
least some probative value. 
Given that survey evidence can be a potentially powerful indicator of 
consumer confusion in the minds of some judges,105 we posit that the 
submission of survey evidence that the court believes has some probative 
value will influence the outcome of the case.  As noted earlier, plaintiffs 
and defendants have different evidentiary burdens in trademark cases.  
Thus, we also test the impact of plaintiff-credited surveys and defendant-
credited surveys as separate variables. 
We also consider whether the strength of a plaintiff’s claim on 
grounds unrelated to survey evidence impacts the influence of consumer 
surveys in court.  For example, if the plaintiff already has a strong case of 
infringement, a consumer survey might not be especially influential.  A 
weak case of infringement, by contrast, might be materially aided by a 
survey.  The impact of survey evidence might also be influenced by 
whether the plaintiff or defendant submits it in a weak or strong case 
context.  For example, if the defendant submits a survey when the plaintiff 
presents strong non-survey evidence of infringement, the survey might be 
treated differently than when a plaintiff’s non-survey case is weak. 
In addition, the impact of a credited or non-credited survey in 
evidence might be influenced by the strength of non-survey evidence in the 
case.  For example, a plaintiff’s chances of winning might be irreparably 
damaged by a non-credited survey if its non-survey evidence is of middling 
 
Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 829 n.142 (2009) (“A control variable is a variable 
that is held constant in order to analyze the relationship between other variables without 
interference.”). 
 105.  E.g., Tone Bros., Inc. v. Sysco Corp., 28 F.3d 1192, 1204 (Fed. Cir. 1994) 
(describing the persuasiveness of survey evidence (citing Co-Rect Prods. v. Marvy! Adver. 
Photography, Inc., 780 F.2d 1324, 1333 n.9. (8th Cir. 1985))); Miller’s Ale House, Inc. v. 
Boynton Carolina Ale House, LLC, No. 09-80918-CIV, 2009 WL 6812111, at *17 (S.D. 
Fla. Oct. 13, 2009) (noting that consumer survey evidence is the best evidence of confusion 
(citing Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv. Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1991))); 
Jewish Sephardic Yellow Pages, Ltd. v. DAG Media, Inc., 478 F. Supp. 2d 340, 364–65 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting that consumer surveys are “‘particularly helpful in divining . . . the 
principal significance’ of the term to the consuming public” (quoting Horizon Mills Corp. v. 
QVC, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d, 208, 216-17 (S.D.N.Y. 2001))). 
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strength.  Alternatively, a plaintiff marshaling strong non-survey evidence 
might be forgiven if the survey evidence proves flawed or incomplete. 
To measure the impact of non-survey evidence on survey receptivity, 
we incorporate as variables the court’s evaluation of certain Polaroid 
factors in the case.  Incorporating every factor, however, remains a problem 
because not all circuits apply all Polaroid factors.106  To ensure equanimity 
across federal circuits, we limited our consideration only to factors that all 
federal circuits rely upon when determining likelihood of infringement.  
Out of the twelve Polaroid factors that courts consider, only four are 
considered by all thirteen federal circuits.107  We eliminated the “evidence 
of actual confusion” factor as a variable because courts sometimes consider 
consumer surveys to be evidence of actual confusion, thus making reliance 
on this factor as non-survey evidence redundant.108 
That left three factors that were uniformly considered across the 
federal circuits:  the similarity of the litigants’ marks to one another, the 
proximity of litigants’ goods to one another in the marketplace, and the 
strength of the plaintiff’s mark amongst the public.  We incorporate these 
variables into our regression analysis to show the impact of non-survey 
proof on consumer survey evidence. 
Although only three variables of the possible twelve are considered in 
this study, these variables can be helpful in illuminating our results.  Beebe 
found that these three variables were disproportionately predictive of the 
outcome of cases.109  Beebe hypothesizes a “stampede effect” when courts 
review these initial factors and then “stampede” the remaining factors in 
order to conform to the initial factor outcomes.110  We thus conclude that 
relying on these factors is potentially telling about the influence of the 
 
 106.  See infra Table 1. 
 107.  See infra Table 1. 
 108.  See, e.g., 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, in MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, § 32:184 (“Several courts, when assembling the evidence 
within a likelihood of confusion framework of factors such as the Polaroid Eight, have put 
survey evidence under the heading of ‘actual confusion.’”).  McCarthy is also careful to 
conclude, however, that survey evidence is circumstantial and should not be treated as direct 
evidence of a likelihood of confusion.  According to McCarthy, direct evidence can only 
come from communications from customers or the exceedingly rare testimony of an 
individual confessing that they were once a confused consumer.  Id. 
 109.  Beebe, supra note 85, at 1622. 
 110.  Id. at 1582, 1617–22.  This occurs in spite of judicial admonitions that all factors 
must be thoroughly considered in likelihood of confusion cases.  See, e.g., Arrow Fastener 
Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 400 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the district 
judge to engage in a deliberate review of each factor, and, if a factor is inapplicable to a 
case, to explain why . . . .  The steady application of Polaroid is critical to the proper 
development of trademark law . . . .”).  The court cautions, however, that courts need not 
slavishly recite all Polaroid factors in each and every case.  Id. (quoting Orient Express 
Trading Co., Ltd. v. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 842 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
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Polaroid factors on survey evidence. 
III.  STUDY FINDINGS 
In this section, we report the results of our analyses.  We also discuss 
how our findings contribute to our understanding of survey evidence and its 
influence.  While some results reinforce prevailing perceptions about 
consumer surveys, others are unexpected and surprisingly illuminating. 
A.  Frequency of Use of Consumer Survey Evidence 
Our data show that survey use is not widespread in reported trademark 
infringement litigation.  Out of the 533 cases reviewed for our dataset, only 
eighty-nine (16.6%) discuss survey evidence.  A plaintiff submitted a 
survey in seventy-four of these cases, defendants in twenty-three, and in 
eight cases both plaintiff and defendant submitted a survey.111 
Thus, even though survey evidence has attracted significant scholarly 
and judicial attention, we find no evidence that surveys are used by a 
majority or even a large plurality of litigants to prove likelihood of 
confusion in federal court.  Our results seem to contradict the exhortation 
by some courts and commentators that consumer survey evidence is 
necessary or even strongly recommended to prove trademark infringement. 
The apparent implication is that consumer surveys are not especially 
useful in likelihood of confusion cases.  If a company is going to court 
without survey evidence, and presumably believing themselves to have a 
reasonable chance of success without such evidence, then a firm may want 
to consider seriously the time and expense involved before commissioning 
survey evidence in a trademark dispute.  Global conclusions cannot be 
made from this result alone, but this surprising result appears to throw into 
question the notion that survey evidence is commonplace and an essential 
component of trademark infringement cases. 
Even though our results show that survey evidence is not present in 
the majority of federal cases, one should take care not to dismiss the 
importance of survey evidence entirely.  In spite of these results, a real 
possibility exists that consumer surveys still have an indirect effect on 
likelihood of confusion cases even if they do not appear in judicial 
opinions. 
For example, surveys can be conducted internally by a company and 
never be used in court.  A firm may commission a survey to determine 
 
 111.  Beebe reported survey usage in twenty percent of the cases in his dataset.  Beebe, 
supra note 85, at 1641. 
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whether a trademark infringement suit is viable against a rival.  The survey 
may produce unfavorable results and get discarded, resulting in the lawsuit 
never taking place.  It is thus possible that the weakest survey evidence 
never leaves the corporation for which it was commissioned. 
If a company commissions a survey and its results are encouraging, it 
can still have an impact outside of the federal courtroom.  Firms, most 
likely large firms with significant resources, may use survey results as 
leverage to extract a favorable settlement from an infringing rival.  The 
rival may evaluate the survey results, realize that its chances of 
successfully defending against a trademark infringement claim are small, 
and settle the claim.  Surveys can be and are instrumental in settlement 
negotiations.112  Thus, the mere potential of survey evidence used against a 
potential litigant could compel it to resolve the dispute out of court. 
Even if litigation begins, we cannot divine from published court 
opinions how often surveys are used, not in litigation, but outside of the 
courtroom.  It is therefore possible that we underestimate the use of surveys 
in trademark litigation since the data we analyze exclude those cases in 
which surveys were used but never surfaced in a court’s judicial opinion.  
Although we cannot say for certain, what we observe in the federal court 
system may merely be the “tip of the iceberg” of survey usage in 
trademark-related disputes.113  Nevertheless, the absence of consumer 
surveys in the vast majority of court decisions is striking and suggests that 
observers who view surveys as essential may overstate their influence. 
Another possible explanation of ours is that survey evidence may have 
been submitted, but never written about, in the judge’s opinion.  Such 
conduct would result in an artificially low percentage of survey cases 
reported.  To account for this potential problem, we randomly selected 
legal briefs from thirty non-survey cases to see if they mentioned survey 
evidence or the submission of a survey by the plaintiff or defendant.  None 
were found.  This suggests that judicial opinions ignoring submitted 
surveys are unlikely and that consumer survey evidence is indeed sparse in 
our data. 
B.  Ability to Help Prove Likelihood of Confusion in Trademark 
Infringement Cases 
Although we now know that consumer surveys are typically not used 
in reported trademark infringement cases, it remains to be seen whether 
 
 112.  See Jacob Jacoby, Experimental Design and the Selection of Controls in 
Trademark and Deceptive Advertising Surveys, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 890, 890 (2002) 
(noting that surveys are used for both litigation and settlement). 
 113.  Id. 
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surveys have any impact in proving or disproving a likelihood of 
confusion.  We begin our analysis with a simple count of wins and losses in 
our dataset.  Out of the 533 decisions mentioned above, there were 60 
instances when the court could not determine whether the plaintiff proved a 
likelihood of confusion because the case had factual issues that remained 
unresolved.  Of the 473 remaining cases, courts found likelihood of 
confusion 242 times (approximately 51.1% of cases).  Courts failed to find 
likelihood of confusion 231 times (approximately 48.8% of cases).114  In 
short, plaintiffs win about half of the time in trademark infringement cases 
without accounting for the presence of survey evidence. 
We further our analysis through the estimation of five logistic 
regression models, displayed in Table 2.  The table consists of five models, 
with one model listed per column.  Each model tests the impact of different 
survey-related variables on the court’s finding of a likelihood of confusion.  
Model 1 is the simplest of the five.  Model 1 examines the relationship 
between probability of a court finding a likelihood of confusion and 
whether or not the plaintiff submitted a survey (logit).  This model simply 
inquires whether the plaintiff’s submission of survey, regardless of other 
factors such as the quality of the survey or the strength of non-survey 
evidence, impacts on a court’s likelihood of confusion finding.  This model 
also does not consider the impact of defendant-submitted evidence.  Our 
results reveal that no statistically significant relationship exists between 
plaintiffs submitting a survey and a finding of likelihood of confusion.  
While this may appear counterintuitive at first glance, and appears to offer 
further proof of the relative irrelevance of survey evidence, we need to 
withhold judgment until accounting for further variables. 
Model 2 adds an additional variable by examining the correlation 
between defendant-submitted surveys and likelihood of confusion 
outcomes.  Presumably, because a defendant needs only to counter the 
plaintiff’s evidence in order to win, defendants proffer fewer surveys than 
plaintiffs.  Our dataset included twenty-three cases where the defendant 
submitted survey evidence, and a court reached a decision in twenty of 
those cases. 
Although Model 2 raises issues of small sample size,115 it also yields 
an interesting result:  while a plaintiff’s submission of a survey does not 
 
 114.  This roughly corresponds to Sarel and Marmorstein’s finding of a fifty percent 
success rate in their dataset.  Sarel & Marmorstein, supra note 20, at 1424. 
 115.   See Matthew Laroche, Is the New York State Court of Appeals Still “Friendless?”: 
An Empirical Study of Amicus Curiae Participation, 72 ALB. L. REV. 701, 754 (2009) 
(“Where sample sizes are small, it is appropriate to exercise caution when interpreting the 
results.”); see also 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, IN MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION, supra note 6, at § 32:171 (noting that small sample size problematic for 
survey design). 
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have a significant relationship on a finding of confusion, a defendant’s 
submission negatively correlated with a finding of a likelihood of 
confusion.  This is not surprising in itself, but is intriguing when considered 
in tandem with the lack of influence from plaintiffs’ submissions.  This 
implies that courts treat plaintiff surveys and defendant surveys differently. 
A number of reasons may explain this phenomenon.  First, plaintiff-
submitted survey evidence may be perceived as unsurprising by some 
courts, since the plaintiff’s burden of proof motivates it to submit as much 
evidence as possible.  When a defendant submits survey evidence, by 
contrast, it is a rare and thus an unexpected event.  A defendant-submitted 
survey may signal to the court that the defendant is serious about defending 
its trademark usage.  The survey may also signal to the court that the 
defendant is confident about winning its case, although if a defendant were 
so sure that consumers would not be confused then a survey would not be 
necessary.  A defendant-submitted survey may neutralize the scientific 
“halo effect” that would accompany a plaintiff-submitted survey not 
rebutted by other seemingly scientific evidence.  Finally, a defendant-
submitted survey merely needs to show that one cannot conclusively 
establish consumer confusion, an easier burden than the plaintiff must bear. 
Model 3 introduces yet another variable, the impact of whether or not 
a consumer survey was credited by the court.  Model 3 investigates both 
the impact of a plaintiff-submitted survey that is credited and a defendant-
submitted survey that is credited.  Once again, the impact of a credited 
survey differs according to which litigant submitted the survey.  Our results 
reveal that when the plaintiff submits a survey and the court credits that 
survey as having probative value favorable to plaintiff, that credited survey 
is strongly and significantly correlated with a finding of likelihood of 
confusion by the court.116 
The finding of Model 3 is not unexpected.  A consumer survey 
represents powerful scientific evidence of likelihood of confusion by 
soliciting the opinions of the very group of consumers that is impacted by 
the presence of competing marks.  Such data should help plaintiffs prove 
 
 116.  The probability that this finding in our data was the result of chance is miniscule, 
represented by a p-value of less than .0001.  As one author succinctly explains:  
 The “p” value is a statistical measure of probability.  For example, a p value of 
less than .05 indicates that the statistical likelihood that the observed result 
occurred by chance is less than 5%, p< .01 means less than 1%, and so forth.  A 
lower p value indicates a higher statistical significance.   
Hon. Donald E. Shelton et al., An Indirect-Effects Model of Mediated Adjudication: The CSI 
Myth, The Tech Effect, and Metropolitan Jurors’ Expectations for Scientific Evidence, 12 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 18 n.60 (2009) (citing Mark J. Schervish, P Values: What They 
Are and What They Are Not, 50 AMER. STATISTICIAN 203 (1996)). 
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their case in court.  Our results reveal that it is likely that plaintiff-
submitted survey evidence, when credited by the court, increases the 
probably of a likelihood of confusion finding. 
Model 3 for defendants produces a different result.  Our results report 
that a court-credited survey submitted by the defendant does not have a 
statistically significant impact on the outcome of the dispute.  Apparently it 
is the presence of the defendant-submitted survey, rather than its 
methodology, quality, or persuasiveness that has the favorable impact on 
the court.  This does not necessarily mean that defendants who are 
conducting surveys should ignore basic survey methodology, but it may 
imply that defendant-submitted surveys are not subjected to the same rigor 
as their plaintiff-submitted counterparts.  The fact that the defendant took 
the time and effort to submit a survey appears to be enough.  Submitting a 
survey that is good enough to actually be credited by a court does not 
appear to further strengthen a defendant’s case. 
In Model 4, we test a set of different but important variables:  the 
Polaroid factors that underlie a finding of likelihood of confusion.  As 
noted earlier, the similarity of the litigants’ marks to one another, the 
proximity of litigants’ goods to one another in the marketplace, and the 
strength of the plaintiff’s mark amongst the public are the three Polaroid 
factors that are most suitable for testing.  These factors are shared by all 
federal circuits and appear to have a strong influence over likelihood of 
confusion findings.  We test whether a court’s determination that a given 
factor favors or disfavors finding likelihood of confusion actually has an 
impact on the outcome of the dispute.  Our results find that these three 
factors are all influential.  Each of these three factors, when found to favor 
a finding of likelihood of confusion by the court, has a statistically 
significant outcome on the result of the case.  For example, when a court 
finds that the trademarks are similar enough to favor a likelihood of 
confusion finding, the court is significantly more likely to find likelihood 
of confusion overall.  This finding also works in reverse.  When a court 
concludes that one of these favors militates against a likelihood of 
confusion finding, the court is overall less likely to reach an overall 
likelihood of confusing finding.  These three factors impact the ultimate 
outcome of trademark infringement disputes. 
Model 5, our most complex model, considers the impact of consumer 
surveys in the context of the strength of the litigants’ non-survey evidence.  
In the previous models, we discerned whether the presence of a survey, the 
presence of a credited survey, or the author of the survey had a significant 
impact on the likelihood of confusion finding.  These models are 
incomplete since the possibility exists that the non-survey Polaroid factors 
may overwhelm the survey evidence and render it immaterial.  Model 5 
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addresses that problem by considering whether these variables still hold 
influence when taking into account the impact of the Polaroid factors on 
judicial outcomes. 
This model reveals that survey evidence indeed remains influential in 
likelihood of confusion cases, even when the influence of Polaroid factors 
is separately taken into account.  The pattern of significance corresponds to 
that in Model 3.  This verifies the inferences made above with respect to 
plaintiffs’ and defendants’ credited and non-credited surveys.  A credited 
plaintiff survey increases the probability of a likelihood of confusion 
finding, a non-credited plaintiff survey decreases it, and any defendant 
survey increases the probability of a no likelihood of confusion finding.  
Even when the non-survey likelihood of confusion factors are taken into 
account, survey evidence remains influential. 
C.  A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Consumer Surveys 
The five models reveal intriguing and useful information about the 
influence of survey evidence in court.  In addition, the algebraic form of the 
logistic regression—upon which these models are based—allows us to 
quantify the precise benefit of consumer survey evidence in a variety of 
contexts.  Not only can we learn about the directional impact of survey 
evidence, but we can also understand more about the magnitude of that 
impact in court. 
Table 3 presents the magnitude of survey impact.  Each row reflects 
one possible combination of the three dominant likelihood of confusion 
factors in a trademark infringement dispute.  Courts could reach three 
different possible conclusions regarding each factor:  the factor favors a 
confusion finding, the factor favors a no-confusion finding, or the factor 
favors neither result.  The number of permutations for three likelihood of 
confusion factors, each having three possible evidentiary outcomes, totals 
twenty-seven.  Accordingly, Table 3 presents twenty-seven rows, each 
representing one possible permutation. 
The first three columns in Table 3 reflect these permutations.  The 
next four columns present the probability of confusion given the 
combinations of factors in the first three columns in various instances.117  
Column 4 presents the probability of a likelihood of confusion finding 
when no survey is presented.  Columns 5, 6, and 7 present the probability 
of a likelihood of confusion finding in cases where only the plaintiff 
submitted a survey, only the defendant submitted a survey, and when both 
 
 117.  These probabilities are all based on Model 5 in Table 2 and assume that the surveys 
are credited. 
BIRD_FINAL_2379679.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2012  5:30 PM 
2012] CONSUMER SURVEYS IN TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 1041 
 
parties submit a survey, respectively. 
The last two columns measure the impact of plaintiff-submitted and 
defendant-submitted surveys in each scenario.118  Each number represents 
the change in probability of likelihood of confusion as a result of the 
survey, given the particular scenario.  For example, reviewing the first row 
shows that when the court finds that all three Polaroid factors favor 
confusion, a plaintiff-submitted survey increases the chances of a confusion 
finding by 3.2%.  A defendant-submitted survey reduces the chances of a 
confusion finding by one percent under similar conditions. 
As Table 3 shows, the impact of a survey varies widely depending on 
the surrounding evidence.  In some situations, survey evidence can have a 
profound impact.  For example, consider the criteria in Row 8 of Table 3.  
This row assumes that the trademarks are similar (favoring confusion), the 
products at issue are not similar (disfavoring confusion), and that it is 
uncertain whether the strength of the mark favors confusion.  In this case, 
submission of a credited consumer survey would increase the probability of 
a confusion finding from .097 to .864, assuming the defendant does not 
submit a survey.  This represents an apparent 76.7% increase in the 
probability that a likelihood of confusion finding will occur from the 
submission of a credited consumer survey by the plaintiff.  In the same 
scenario, the defendant’s submission of a credited survey appears to reduce 
the probability of a likelihood of confusion finding by 61.5%. 
Although showing mathematical impacts such as these can appear 
overly convincing, one should interpret Table 3 cognizant of its limitations.  
As noted earlier, only a fraction of our dataset contains cases where survey 
evidence is evaluated by the court.  Segmenting this portion of the dataset 
by the three Polaroid factors only slices the size of the dataset into smaller 
portions.  The result of such segmentation is that the probabilities and 
impacts in Table 3 should be interpreted as showing trends, rather than a 
precise measurement of future effects. 
These trends, however, reveal that surveys play varying roles for 
plaintiffs.  Surveys seem to be most helpful to plaintiffs when non-survey 
proof is of middling strength.  In each of the five scenarios where plaintiff-
submitted surveys appear most influential, there is a mix of “confusion,” 
“no confusion,” and “neither” findings.119  Conversely, plaintiff-submitted 
 
 118.  Each scenario assumes that when a plaintiff submits a survey, the defendant does 
not submit survey evidence.  The reverse applies to the column showing the impact of a 
defendant-submitted survey.  Indeed, the empirical likelihood of both plaintiff and 
defendant submitting a survey in trademark infringement litigation is quite low. 
 119.  For the convenience of the reader, the five evidentiary conditions when plaintiff’s 
survey is most influential are reproduced here from Table 3: 
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surveys do not appear to be influential when the plaintiff’s case is 
particularly weak or strong.  In each of the five conditions where plaintiff-
submitted survey evidence is least influential, two or more of the factors 
indicate “confusion” or “no confusion.”120  In fact, the weakest and 
strongest possible evidentiary conditions, whereby all three factors either 
favor or do not favor confusion, are scenarios where plaintiff-submitted 
survey evidence appears to have little effect.  When key non-survey 
evidence is especially strong, a plaintiff appears not to need survey 
evidence in order to show a likelihood of confusion.  When key non-survey 
evidence is especially weak, survey evidence will typically be insufficient 
to overcome a finding of no likelihood of confusion. 
In the case of defendant-submitted evidence, similar principles apply.  
Defendant-submitted surveys appear to be most influential in cases 
involving middling evidence.  Indeed, four of the five conditions in which 
surveys are most influential for the plaintiff are the same conditions that are 
most influential for the defendant.  The conditions in which defendant-
submitted surveys are least influential also roughly correspond to plaintiff-











Confusion No Confusion Neither 0.767 
Confusion Neither No Confusion 0.756 
No Confusion Confusion Confusion 0.756 
Neither Confusion No Confusion 0.753 
Neither Neither Neither 0.739 
 
Out of the five conditions, the no confusion/confusion/confusion scenario appears out of 
place because it appears to represent a strong evidentiary case on behalf of the plaintiff.  
However, the similarity of marks prong is overwhelmingly influential in trademark cases.  
An adverse finding on this prong alone may be so devastating that it needs survey evidence 
to bolster it, even though the other two dominant factors favor confusion.  See Beebe, supra 
note 85, at 1623 (concluding that “[t]he data clearly show that the similarity of the marks 
factor is by far the most important factor in the multifactor test.”). 
 120.  For the convenience of the reader, the five evidentiary conditions when plaintiff’s 











Neither No Confusion No Confusion 0.057 
Confusion Confusion Confusion 0.032 
No Confusion Neither No Confusion 0.032 
No Confusion No Confusion Neither 0.018 
No Confusion No Confusion No Confusion 0.002 
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role in trademark infringement cases.  Where key Polaroid factors are 
indeterminate, defendant-submitted surveys can play an influential role.  
Where key Polaroid factors strongly point in one direction, defendant-
submitted surveys have little impact. 
While remaining cognizant of the limitations mentioned above, these 
probability measurements can enable primitive calculations to determine 
whether a survey is financially viable under a given set of conditions.  For 
example, assume that a plaintiff-submitted survey improves the probability 
of success by 10.5% or .105.  A relatively small increase in the probability 
of success might imply that a plaintiff should not submit a survey in this 
instance. 
This depends, however, on the expected benefit of the survey relative 
to the value of the potential favorable verdict.  Assume that the plaintiff 
assesses the expected value of its claim, net of attorney’s fees and costs, at 
$1,000,000.  If a survey costs $100,000 to administer,121 and the survey 
produces an incremental increase in probability of .105, the litigant should 
conduct the survey because the benefit of the survey ($1,000,000 * 1.05 = 
$105,000) is greater than the cost ($100,000) of creating it. 
Thus, using Table 3, a litigant could improve his or her decision-
making about whether to conduct a consumer survey by performing a 
realistic assessment of its likelihood of confusion claim and financial data 
based on court behavior in prior similar cases.  Such calculations can be 
made for any combination of the likelihood of confusion factors provided 
based upon an objective assessment of the strength of one’s own legal 
claim.  Such a calculation is far from an exact science, given the limitations 
of the data and the fact-sensitive nature of each trademark infringement 
claim, but using this information may improve decisions and reduce 
uncertainty in outcomes. 
IV.  REEVALUATING THE ROLE OF SURVEY EVIDENCE 
We briefly consider, in light of these data, whether the role of survey 
evidence in trademark infringement cases needs to be redefined.  Courts 
should refrain from making an adverse inference when litigants do not 
submit a consumer survey as an evidentiary part of their case.  As 
discussed earlier, a number of judges have concluded that the absence of a 
survey implies a weak case or outright laxness by the parties.  However, as 
our findings show, the significant majority of litigants do not use consumer 
 
 121.  See Peter Weiss, The Use of Survey Evidence in Trademark Litigation: Science, Art 
or Confidence Game?, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 71, 85 n.30 (1990) (“A fairly reliable mini-
survey can be done for $5,000 or less.  The cost of a major survey tends to start at around 
$30,000 and can run up to $100,000 or more.”). 
BIRD_FINAL_2379679.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/16/2012  5:30 PM 
1044 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 14:4 
 
surveys in reported likelihood of confusion cases. 
Thus, it is doubtful that the significant majority of trademark litigants, 
and their associated attorneys, are lax.  Instead, the choice is likely a 
calculated decision to not submit such evidence based upon time, cost, and 
administrative burdens.  As noted earlier, consumer surveys are expensive 
to design and implement.122  Plaintiffs with limited resources will not be 
able to afford one.  Litigants are also deterred from submitting survey 
evidence because courts can be excessively picky about consumer survey 
design,123 making it difficult to submit survey evidence that will reliably 
pass judicial muster.  There are also, as our findings show, calculated 
financial reasons for choosing not to submit a survey given the assessed 
strength of the claim. 
The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, the entity responsible for 
hearing specialized trademark cases such as appeals from patent examiners 
and opposition proceedings filed against trademark applicants, explicitly 
does not require parties to submit surveys and refuses to draw negative 
inferences from the lack of survey evidence.124  The Board remarked that 
“[n]either party is obligated, in a proceeding before the Board, to spend the 
effort and expense to obtain such evidence.”125  The federal circuits 
reviewing likelihood of confusion cases should follow the Board’s lead by 
clearly and explicitly refusing to make an adverse inference from a lack of 
survey evidence. 
In the alternative, however, we acknowledge that there may be 
situations in which a court may feel compelled to make a negative 
inference in the absence of such evidence.  If a negative inference must be 
made from the lack of a survey, it may be appropriate under conditions 
cited by Edelman.126  Edelman writes that the lack of survey evidence 
should hurt a plaintiff’s case only if the case is suitable for a survey, there 
is ample time to conduct a survey, no logistical obstacles are present, and 
there is no other persuasive evidence of actual confusion.127  These criteria, 
perhaps with the additional consideration of financial ability, create a 
situation that could possibly create a negative inference.  However, due to 
the difficulties in survey construction and submission, such an adverse 
inference should be rare indeed. 
Although courts should not fault litigants for failing to marshal survey 
 
 122.  Bird, supra note 20, at 104. 
 123.  See Bird, supra note 13, at 283–84 (discussing Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 31 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1468, 1471 (W.D. Mo. 1994)). 
 124.  McDonald’s Corp v. McClain, 37 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1274, 1276–77 (T.T.A.B. 1995). 
 125.  Id. at 1277. 
 126.  Edelman, supra note 49, at 766–67. 
 127.  Id. 
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evidence, such evidence can still retain significant persuasive power under 
certain circumstances.  As a result, courts should evaluate the 
methodological validity of survey evidence according to well established 
criteria.  There are already a number of sources, mentioned earlier, that 
offer detailed and intelligent guidelines on all aspects of survey design.128  
Our results show, though indirectly, that survey evidence is vulnerable to 
arbitrary factors.  For example, courts appear to treat plaintiff-produced 
surveys and defendant-produced surveys differently.  The mere submission 
of a survey by a defendant appears to help her case, while a plaintiff-
submitted survey can potentially hurt her case if the court deems it flawed.  
Although the burdens of proof are different between plaintiffs and 
defendants, the evidentiary weight of a survey’s design and implementation 
should not vary significantly simply due to which party submitted it. 
Our research also adds a new dimension to the literature on survey 
evidence—the status of the party making the submission—a characteristic 
rarely studied in survey research.129  In theory, courts should treat survey 
evidence equally, regardless of which party, plaintiff or defendant, 
submitted the evidence.  Our study finds, however, that courts treat survey 
evidence differently according to whether the submitting litigant is a 
plaintiff or a defendant.  Future research studying the impact of consumer 
surveys on court decisions or the construction of survey evidence in 
litigation should incorporate this dimension.  This research opens up the 
possibility that survey evidence submitted in trademark dilution,130 
deceptive advertising,131 and genericide132 cases may also be susceptible to 
litigant-status preferences by the court. 
Finally, the findings in this paper reinforce calls to reform the current 
state of the Lanham Act multifactor test used in likelihood of confusion 
cases.  The current likelihood of confusion criteria potentially misleads 
litigants into believing that all of the factors will be given equal weight.  
While some courts affirm that all factors are equally important and must be 
considered, a number of courts do not give each factor similar 
importance.133  Our findings, as well as Beebe’s findings,134 that three 
 
 128.  AAKER ET AL., supra note 67; Diamond, supra note 66; Gauthier, supra note 65. 
    129. Ruth M. Corbin & Arthur Renaud, When Confusion Surveys Collide: Poor Designs 
or Good Science?, 94 Trademark Rep. 781, 781–82 (2004) (discussing the lack of survey 
research that takes account of party status). 
 130.  Bird, supra note 20, at 102. 
 131.  Stewart, supra note 52, at 15–16. 
 132.  Taylor & Walsh, supra note 23, at 161. 
 133.  Frank Mead, Note, Cocaine, Coffee Mugs, Sex, and Bug Killing Floor Wax: 
Welcome to the Realm of Parody and the Likelihood of Confusion, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 
305, 308–09 (1999) (“The test applied by the courts is called the ‘likelihood of confusion 
test.’  However, the only thing that is confusing is the application of this test.  To begin, 
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factors are disproportionately influential, only reinforce the uncertainty of 
the criteria.  As Table 3 shows, even without survey evidence, when the 
three aforementioned factors (similarity of the marks, proximity of the 
goods, and strength of the plaintiff’s mark) favor confusion, courts find in 
favor of the plaintiff more than 95% of the time.  Other factors, such as the 
sophistication of consumers and the similarity of advertising methods, are 
less substantial considerations than the aforementioned critical factors. 
Our findings reinforce the results of another study finding that the 
consumer sophistication, a factor in determining likelihood of confusion, 
was actually influenced by the similarity of brand names.135  This 
conclusion supports our finding that similarity of marks is an influential 
factor in determining likelihood of confusion.  Our findings also generally 
encourage further work that studies the impact of individual factors in the 
likelihood of confusion criteria.136 
Two possible recommendations can emerge from the issue of 
disproportionate influence of the three dominant Polaroid factors.  The first 
recommendation is to establish a nationwide standard of likelihood of 
confusion criteria across all federal circuits.  Currently, each federal circuit 
uses a different multifactor test, and despite multiple recent Supreme Court 
opinions on trademark law, the Court has yet to adopt a nationwide 
standard.  Such a standard would help to develop more uniform precedent 
and increase certainty of outcomes.  The second recommendation is to 
reduce the likelihood of confusion determination to the three dominant 
factors mentioned earlier plus a fourth factor, actual evidence of confusion, 
which would allow for admission of consumer surveys and other direct 
evidence. 
A less radical change would be to retain the non-dominant criteria, but 
enable courts to use them only when the first dominant four factors do not 
resolve the question of confusion.  Given the explanatory power already 
found, such situations would be infrequent, but would still allow judicial 
flexibility if the court deemed it appropriate.  In spite of the apparent need 
for greater uniformity and clarity for likelihood of confusion criteria, the 
Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities to establish uniform factors 
when it decided trademark infringement cases and has refused to do so.  
 
each circuit court applies the test differently, utilizing only those factors it deems 
important.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 134.  Beebe, supra note 85, at 1591. 
 135.  Daniel J. Howard et al., The Effects of Brand Name Similarity on Brand Source 
Confusion: Implications for Trademark Infringement, 19 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 250, 
261–62 (2000). 
 136.  Thomas R. Lee et al., Trademarks, Consumer Psychology, and the Sophisticated 
Consumer, 57 EMORY L.J. 575, 578–79 (2008); Jerre B. Swann, Sophistication and the 
Sciences, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1309, 1314–15 (2007). 
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Thus, the chance of such a reform remains unlikely. 
V.  LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The results reviewed and the cost-benefit tools built in the previous 
sections are only as valid as the data used to obtain them.  We only 
examined a seven-year period (2000–2006).  It is not clear whether our 
results are stable over time.  Also, economic fluctuation may impact 
whether litigation is brought (litigation is costly) and whether a survey is 
conducted (surveys are expensive too), but this would only exacerbate the 
low incidence of survey usage.  In addition, we do not know about surveys 
that were conducted, found to have unfavorable results, and never 
introduced into evidence. 
We do not know the role that surveys played in litigation that was 
settled and never reached trial.  It is possible, if not likely, that surveys play 
a very different role in cases that settle than in those that go to trial.  To the 
extent that surveys force settlement, our estimate of the degree to which 
they are used could be vastly understated.  The limitation of the size of the 
defendant-submitted survey dataset is also a limitation.  Defendants 
frequently limit themselves to critiquing the plaintiff’s survey methodology 
and results.  As such, our conclusions regarding defendants can only be 
considered tentative owing to small samples. 
Like any scientific research, no survey is perfect.  As one survey 
expert explained, “I know of no survey, in trademark litigation or 
elsewhere, which fulfills one hundred percent the requirements of its 
model.”137  As a result, future research is needed to examine under what 
conditions surveys are most persuasive to a court.  Some, although by no 
means all, of the limitations in this research can be addressed in future 
work. 
Of particular interest for future research are cases where a litigant 
submitted a survey that was credited by the court but the litigant still failed 
to persuade the court overall.  For plaintiffs, this would occur when a 
plaintiff submitted a survey showing consumer confusion, the court 
considered the survey credible, and the plaintiff still failed to prove 
infringement.  For defendants, this would occur when a defendant 
submitted a survey showing little or no confusion, the court considered the 
survey credible, and the plaintiff proved a likelihood of confusion anyway.  
These cases may offer insight into what conditions negate the impact of an 
otherwise persuasive survey.  Such information might be useful for litigants 
 
 137.  Robert C. Sorensen, Survey Research Execution in Trademark Litigation: Does 
Practice Make Perfection?, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 349, 351 (1983). 
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facing an opponent who has presented well-constructed consumer surveys 
in court.  Another intriguing topic for further study would be to examine 
which factors evaluated to determine survey quality (i.e., universe, sample 
size, interview techniques) are most vulnerable to judicial critique in order 
to reveal issues most critical for future survey design.  Although 
encouraging studies exist about the nature of consumer surveys, there is 
much to learn about their influence. 
CONCLUSION 
Brands are big business.  They define the public face of organizations 
and have immense power to shape the perception of consumers toward a 
product or service.  Brands are as vulnerable as they are valuable.  Firms 
can tarnish their own brands through strategic errors.  Upstart rivals can 
outflank brands with their own marketing strategies, making seemingly 
new and innovative products appear out of date by comparison.  While the 
law does not interfere with fair competition, trademarks protect brands 
from inappropriate consumer confusion created by a rival brand so similar 
that it can be mistakenly associated with the established trademark. 
The consumer survey is one of the most widely studied methods of 
proving consumer confusion in court.  The consumer survey has a radiance 
of scientific certainty about it.  Its scientific nature and direct questioning 
of consumers may seem to some as disproportionally persuasive to a judge 
lacking expert training.  At first glance, one can wonder whether consumer 
surveys are perceived by some as the magic bullet of trademark litigation. 
This study reveals that we now know more than we once did about 
consumer surveys’ use and importance.  Consumer surveys are not used as 
often as some would imply.  They are also not universally influential.  
While surveys can prove persuasive under certain conditions, they might 
not be useful for litigants with particularly weak or strong evidence.  
Presentation of survey evidence still remains an individual decision left to 
the attorney and his trademark-owning client.  However, litigants can now 
make decisions that are at least partially informed by prior judicial activity 
and experience.  In some cases, the most efficient survey is the one that is 
never commissioned in the first place. 
While this article sheds light on consumer surveys, there is still much 
to learn.  Survey evidence exists in a variety of contexts outside trademark 
infringement litigation, and an intriguing issue is to what extent the 
conclusions offered here apply in other contexts.  Empirical studies like 
this one and those completed by other authors offer a springboard from 
which to conduct further research.  Although survey evidence may always 
remain in some sense a “black box” of litigation, the further study of such 
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evidence can provide important knowledge about the construction, use, and 
reception of potentially highly persuasive and influential scientific 
evidence in court. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11 DC. FED* 
1 Similarity of the marks x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 
2 Proximity of the goods x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 
3 Evidence of actual confusion x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 
4 Strength of plaintiff’s mark x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 
5 Defendant’s intent x x x x x x x x x x x x  
 
6 Sophistication of consumers x x x  
 





Similarity of advertising and 
 marketing methods x  x x x x x  x x x  
 
 
8 Similarity of sales facilities x  
 
x x  x  
 
 x  x 
 




















Length of time of concurrent use without 



















































Source:  Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1581 (2006). 
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 TABLE 2: BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS RELATING SURVEYS TO PROBABILITY OF FINDING 
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION {PR(C)} 
 
VARIABLE MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 
Plaintiff’s Survey 
 
-.166 -.112 -1.728c  -2.634d 
Defendant’s Survey 
 
 -.912b -1.207a  -2.007a 
Plaintiff’s Survey Credited 
 
  3.490e  6.714e 
Defendant’s Survey Credited 
 
  .744  -.845 
Similarity of Marks Favoring Confusion 
 
   2.210e 2.214d 
Similarity of Marks Favoring No Confusion 
 
   -3.156e -3.637e 
Similarity of Products Favoring Confusion 
 
   1.235c 1.324c 
Similarity of Products Favoring No Confusion 
 
   -2.763e -3.037e 
Strength of Plaintiff’s Mark Favoring Confusion 
 
   1.140b 1.267c 
Strength of Plaintiff’s Mark Favoring No Confusion 
 
   -2.104e -2.417e 
Constant 
 
.068 .098 .091 -1.390b -1.411b 
-2 LOG LIKELIHOOD 655.09 651.47 619.09 198.48 176.39 
 
a – p<.10 
b – p< .05 
c – p<.01 
d – p<.001 
e – p<.0001  
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TABLE 3: PROBABILITIES OF FINDING LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION {PR(C)} FOR 

















1 Confusion Confusion Confusion 0.968 0.032 -0.010 
2 Confusion Confusion Neither 0.893 0.104 -0.035 
3 Confusion Confusion No Confusion 0.428 0.550 -0.280 
4 Confusion Neither Confusion 0.888 0.110 -0.037 
5 Confusion Neither Neither 0.691 0.302 -0.119 
6 Confusion Neither No Confusion 0.166 0.756 -0.541 
7 Confusion No Confusion Confusion 0.275 0.682 -0.417 
8 Confusion No Confusion Neither 0.097 0.767 -0.615 
9 Confusion No Confusion No Confusion 0.009 0.352 -0.332 
10 Neither Confusion Confusion 0.765 0.230 -0.085 
11 Neither Confusion Neither 0.478 0.504 -0.243 
12 Neither Confusion No Confusion 0.076 0.753 -0.627 
13 Neither Neither Confusion 0.464 0.517 -0.253 
14 Neither Neither Neither 0.196 0.739 -0.505 
15 Neither Neither No Confusion 0.021 0.541 -0.500 
16 Neither No Confusion Confusion 0.040 0.671 -0.597 
17 Neither No Confusion Neither 0.012 0.397 -0.374 
18 Neither No Confusion No Confusion 0.001 0.057 -0.055 
19 No Confusion Confusion Confusion 0.079 0.756 -0.626 
20 No Confusion Confusion Neither 0.024 0.565 -0.519 
21 No Confusion Confusion No Confusion 0.002 0.111 -0.106 
22 No Confusion Neither Confusion 0.022 0.552 -0.508 
23 No Confusion Neither Neither 0.006 0.269 -0.256 
24 No Confusion Neither No Confusion 0.001 0.032 -0.031 
25 No Confusion No Confusion Confusion 0.001 0.060 -0.057 
26 No Confusion No Confusion Neither 0.000 0.018 -0.017 
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ROW NUMBER PR(C|PLAINTIFF SURVEY) PR(C |DEFENDANT SURVEY) PR(C|BOTH SURVEYS) 
1 0.999 0.609 0.989 
2 0.998 0.305 0.963 
3 0.978 0.038 0.698 
4 0.998 0.293 0.961 
5 0.992 0.104 0.873 
6 0.922 0.010 0.381 
7 0.957 0.019 0.540 
8 0.864 0.006 0.249 
9 0.361 0.000 0.029 
10 0.995 0.145 0.910 
11 0.982 0.046 0.739 
12 0.829 0.004 0.202 
13 0.981 0.043 0.728 
14 0.935 0.013 0.430 
15 0.563 0.001 0.063 
16 0.711 0.002 0.114 
17 0.409 0.001 0.035 
18 0.058 0.000 0.003 
19 0.835 0.004 0.209 
20 0.588 0.001 0.069 
21 0.113 0.000 0.007 
22 0.574 0.001 0.066 
23 0.275 0.000 0.019 
24 0.033 0.000 0.002 
25 0.061 0.000 0.003 
26 0.018 0.000 0.001 
27 0.002 0.000 0.000 
 
